Review of "Industrial Policy and Development: The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation" by Harrison, Ann
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Review of ”Industrial Policy and
Development: The Political Economy of
Capabilities Accumulation”
Ann Harrison
Journal of Economic Literature
2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47865/
MPRA Paper No. 47865, posted 28 June 2013 15:18 UTC
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. L (December 2012)1132
America is both a brief for and a very accessible 
introduction to a quite different and understud-
ied set of interventions. 
Charles C. Brown
University of Michigan
L Industrial Organization
Industrial Policy and Development: The Political 
Economy of Capabilities Accumulation. Edited 
by Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz. Initiative for Policy Dialogue Series. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009. Pp. xix, 575. $45.00, paper. ISBN 978–
0–19–923526–1, cloth; 978–0–19–923527–8, 
pbk. JEL 2010–0994
There has been a remarkable convergence over 
the last several decades in thinking about the 
building blocks of economic growth. The impor-
tance of macroeconomic stability, high rates of 
physical and human capital investment, a strong 
rule of law, and capable institutions are gener-
ally agreed to be critical components of success. 
There is one ingredient, however, on which a typ-
ical economist in Beijing and a random professor 
from Harvard or Princeton are likely to disagree: 
the role for industrial policy. 
The book Industrial Policy and Development: 
the Political Economy of Capabilities 
Accumulation makes a fervent case for the 
supportive role played by industrial policy in 
development. The book is coedited by three 
well-known critics of laissez faire capital-
ism: Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, and Joseph 
Stiglitz. Like a number of other iconoclasts, they 
see the 2008–09 financial crisis as heralding the 
failure of modern capitalism. They are not shy 
about their claims: 
At last, the realization of the impressive 
failures of the recipe has finally sobered up 
a significant share of both economists and 
policy makers . . . the tsunami hitting the 
world financial markets is forcing even the 
most stubborn believers in the miraculous 
properties of ‘markets’ to accept markets as 
they exist and not as they are portrayed in 
economic textbooks . . . this book, however, 
is not about beating a dead horse . . . rather, 
this book is about industrial policies seen 
as intrinsic fundamental ingredients of all 
development processes. (1)
The vision of development and the critical role 
for industrial policy proposed by the various con-
tributors in this volume could be summarized 
as follows. Economic growth occurs when an 
economy is able to go through radical structural 
shifts, such as the movement from an agrarian to 
an industrial economy. That change can only hap-
pen through the accumulation of knowledge, the 
implementation or adaption of new technology, 
and the coordination across many different sec-
tors. The source of the market failure stems from 
both the public goods nature of knowledge as well 
as the coordination problems involved in bringing 
together many different actors to make innovation 
happen. The authors are skeptical that the market 
by itself will both generate sufficient knowledge 
and solve the coordination problem. Hence they 
argue that there is a critical role for industrial 
policy. They write that “the idea that a Toyota, a 
Samsung, a Tata, an Embraer can just naturally 
spring up out of a multitude of peasants, just due, 
again, to the ‘magic of the market’, is a fairy tale 
that few ought to be ready to believe” (4).
In their view, the effectiveness of industrial 
policy involves the interplay of two forces: con-
gruence between “ingredients,” such as invest-
ment in human capital and subsidies to pivotal 
sectors, and the “institutions” that would allow 
the coordination and exploitation of knowledge. 
Hence, success of industrial policy will require 
an interaction of key policies (such as educa-
tional investments or R&D) and institutions that 
ensure that those policies are used to transform 
the economy and not to line the pockets of rent-
seeking politicians. 
From this perspective, allowing a country’s 
development path to follow market forces will 
condemn it to languish forever in the land of 
cheap textiles and shoddy toys. Comparative 
advantage can be tinkered with. No country has 
moved from a backward to a leading industrial 
producer without extensive involvement from the 
state in the form of tariffs, subsidies, and targeted 
sector-level support.
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One of the most provocative claims by the 
authors is that the successful industrial coun-
tries applied steep tariffs on their way to suc-
cess, and now seek to maintain their edge by 
discouraging its use among others. One ongoing 
theme is that all successful industrializers, from 
Germany and the United States two centuries 
ago to Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, China, and India, 
have used industrial policy. Chapter 6 (written 
by Yilmaz Akyuz) is particularly effective, docu-
menting very high tariff rates in Great Britain, 
Germany, France, and the United States. Akyuz, 
a former director at UNCTAD, points out that in 
the past, “protectionism was the rule, free trade 
the exception” (147). It was only after World War 
II that the United States reduced its tariffs from 
averages of 20 to 50 percent, having successfully 
established its dominance behind protectionist 
barriers. Akyuz attacks computable general equi-
librium studies suggesting extravagant benefits 
from liberalizing for developing countries under 
the Uruguay Round. He points out that many of 
these studies focus on static gains from trade, 
while what developing countries care about are 
innovation and the ability to shift comparative 
advantage so that countries end up on a higher 
growth trajectory.
This argument is missing a crucial step. Simply 
because the United States had high tariffs while it 
was developing into a world power does not prove 
that the United States developed because of its 
high tariffs. Perhaps the United States (or China, 
or India) would have grown even faster without 
these high tariffs. We don’t know what the coun-
terfactual would have been. To identify the gains 
from industrial policy would require either a 
properly implemented randomized trial—where 
some countries or sectors are randomly allocated 
high tariffs—or a convincing instrumental vari-
able approach. The authors of the volume present 
neither.
This fallacy is one important weakness of this 
otherwise intriguing book. In the second half of 
the book, the authors present country case stud-
ies. So we learn that Latin American countries 
extensively employed industrial policy through-
out the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. In the 1990s, 
there has been a return to the use of industrial 
policies, including sector-level encouragement, 
cluster policies, and so-called horizontal policies 
which are in theory neutral but ex post always 
promote some sectors over others. The real 
issue—as Wilson Peres points out in his chapter 
on “The (Slow) Return of Industrial Policies in 
Latin America and the Caribbean”—is the lack 
of impact evaluation to allow us to link sectoral or 
country success with the use of industrial policy.
My least favorite chapter explores the role of 
multinational firms. Alice Amsden argues that 
foreign firms do not play an important role in 
the industrialization and catch up of developing 
countries. All the evidence that I have seen (see 
my summary of the literature in Harrison and 
Rodriguez Clare (2010) or my work on China in 
Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2012)) contradicts 
this claim. Accumulated evidence shows that joint 
ventures consistently exhibit higher productivity 
and play an important role in promoting indus-
trialization through vertical linkages with domes-
tic suppliers. Amsden, who claims that MNCs in 
developing countries act like bureaucrats without 
any important innovative or entrepreneurial role, 
does not provide evidence to back up her claims.
On the other hand, I particularly enjoyed the 
iconoclastic treatment of Industrial Policy in India, 
written by Ajit Singh. Singh presents a rebuttal 
to the orthodox claim that India’s industrial poli-
cies hurt the country and that without them India 
would have done much better. In the 1980s, India’s 
growth rate accelerated. Some have attributed this 
change to globalization and dismantling of the 
industrial policy regime but Singh argues that the 
results were due to internal deregulation and not 
to abandonment of India’s industrial policy. He 
also argues that India’s achievement in science and 
technology was accomplished by following an edu-
cational path dictated by the country’s own politi-
cal economy rather than by implementing policies 
advocated by the World Bank. 
Singh argues that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, India’s great success with information 
technology was due in large part to its industrial 
policy, not to the fact that this sector benefited 
from benign neglect. In assessing the informa-
tion technology sectors success, he suggests that 
“the characterization of benign neglect by the 
government is grossly inaccurate and misleading” 
(284). India’s comparative advantage in software 
development, which stems from its comparative 
advantage of cheap skilled labor, “did not arise 
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spontaneously but was helped, in fact established, 
by the government” (285). Government support 
helped not only in the information technology 
sector but also in the biotechnology and phar-
maceutical industries. The government played a 
critical role in the establishment of Bangalore as 
a hub attracting the bulk of India’s scientific and 
technological activity. Looking forward, Singh 
sees industrial policy as critical in helping to 
 foster employment-creating growth and helping 
to address the problem of rising inequality.
Ultimately, what policymakers would like to 
know is which kinds of industrial policies have 
been most successful and how should industrial 
policy be used—if at all—going forward? In par-
ticular, have the benefits of industrial policy from 
addressing market failure outweighed the possible 
costs of government failure? There is one chapter 
that specifically addresses this issue—chapter 
13. Chapter 13 correctly identifies the biggest 
puzzle associated with industrial policies: differ-
ent countries have adopted seemingly identical 
policies, but the outcomes are quite different. As 
an example, Brazil tried the same types of export 
promotion policies adopted by South Korea, but 
did not succeed. The question is why. The chap-
ter takes a different tone than the usual expla-
nation based on the weak capacity of the state. 
Mushtaq Khan and Stephanie Blankenburg, the 
chapter authors, argue that blaming the failure 
of industrial policy on weak state capacity under-
estimates the importance of industrial policy in 
successful developing countries. They also argue 
that the distinctive feature of successful East 
Asian industrial policy was not exceptional state 
capacities. Rather the distinctive feature of suc-
cess was “that the particular variant of industrial 
policy that each tried was compatible with inter-
nal power balances that allowed the state to cre-
ate incentives and compulsions in critical areas”. 
They continue on page 344:
The widespread failure of developing coun-
tries to catch up with advanced countries is at 
least partly attributable to the failure of their 
institutions to compel productivity growth 
in the learning industries, which requires 
institutions that can manage provided rents 
and provide credible compulsions and condi-
tions for rapid learning. Thus, the institutions 
for inducing learning must both provide the 
incentives for learning and have the credibil-
ity to impose costs and sanctions on industries 
and firms that fail to achieve the required 
rate of learning. If the state does not have 
the credibility to withdraw a subsidy when 
there is underperformance, there will be a 
short-run costs as well as a permanent cost, 
because infant industries will never grow up. 
The authors suggest that states are unlikely to 
have the capacity to be able to first provide and 
subsequently withdraw rents when a country has 
both a strong landed elite and early urbanization. 
Reading this essay, I found it difficult to see the 
difference between exceptional state capability 
(which the authors argue is not necessary) and 
the ability to design industrial policies in line 
with state capacity. 
This volume is a pleasure to read for several 
reasons. First, it brings together in one book the 
different proponents for industrial policy and 
the range of arguments for its implementation. 
This book aligns itself against the Washington 
Consensus view, and makes it clear that in many 
parts of the world there is no such “consensus” 
that laissez faire is optimal. The volume is also 
very persuasive in documenting the extensive 
use of industrial policy across all countries, and 
its historically important role in the now success-
ful industrial countries. Finally, the book brings 
together a number of arguments for why indus-
trial policy is needed. 
The book comes up short in two respects. First, 
it fails to persuade the reader that the use of IP 
led to better outcomes. The authors argue that 
their thesis is not amenable to empirical test-
ing, because they are focusing on the interaction 
between good (IP) policies and proper enabling 
institutions. But a clever empiricist could intro-
duce such an interaction in an estimating equa-
tion. More fundamentally, without any sort of 
serious empirical work attempting to sort out the 
identification from policies to outcomes, it is dif-
ficult for the reader to accept correlation as proof.
Second, what policy makers need is a practical 
“how to” guide that will help them successfully 
address market failures and minimize rent-seek-
ing from greedy agents. Chapter 13 begins to 
address this question but ends with very  general 
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statements about the need to tailor industrial 
policy to each state’s individual capabilities. One 
solution, which I advocate with my coauthors 
(Aghion et al. 2012), is to ensure that all industrial 
policies are conducted in a highly competitive 
environment. The book is agnostic and sometimes 
contradictory on the need to combine industrial 
policy with competition, which it shouldn’t be. 
India’s industrial policies and the License Raj 
would have been much more effective if internal 
competition had been encouraged. Nevertheless, 
the book is engaging and refreshing in its per-
spective. All too frequently, collected volumes 
put together a disparate set of viewpoints, which 
leave the reader bewildered. In this volume, the 
authors speak with nearly one voice. While not 
everyone will agree with this book, it presents a 
viewpoint which has resonated in East Asia. For 
that reason alone, readers should take note. 
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The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding 
Rings. By Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. 
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2012. Pp. xii, 302. $35.00. ISBN 978–0–262–
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The Economics of Collusion is a compact trea-
tise that examines cooperative behavior among 
supposed free-market competitors.1 Robert 
Marshall and Leslie Marx (not Alfred and 
Karl) synthesize recent research on cartels and 
1 This review was prepared while the author was a 
Visiting Scholar at the University of South Australia.
 collusion in a style that generally is accessible to 
human beings (vis-à-vis professional economists). 
The mathematics is limited and examples are 
numerous, although most references to the lit-
erature are, curiously, limited to recent decades. 
There was serious study of cartels before the 
1980s that uncovered many essential insights still 
used today. 
The volume benefits enormously from the 
authors’ experience working on antitrust mat-
ters. It would be richer if it incorporated tales 
from more of the classic price-fixing cases. For 
example, I would think it is difficult to write a 
book about collusion in the manufacturing sec-
tor (Marshall and Marx focus on homogeneous 
manufactured intermediate goods) without 
mentioning the very first federally prosecuted 
 cartel, Jellico Mountain Coal (1891), or the Great 
Electrical Conspiracy of the 1950s, in which 
Westinghouse, General Electric, Allis-Chalmers, 
and several dozen other sellers of large-scale elec-
trical equipment to  public utilities were convicted 
of price fixing. (Lean, Ogur, and Rogers 1982.) 
Their agreements were varied, involving identical 
bids, pricing formulas for complicated products, 
and even a “phases of the moon” system used to 
allocate the low-bid for high voltage switchgear. 
The bidding ring eventually was brought to the 
attention of federal antitrust authorities by a pur-
chasing agent who noticed patterns in the bids. 
Federal prosecution in 1960–61 led to the incar-
ceration of seven executives, the first time price 
fixers found themselves staring out at the world 
through vertical bars rather than off the country 
club veranda. The story fits into Marshall and 
Marx’s book well, offering numerous examples 
supporting their theses, and for several decades 
was the big collusion story.
The authors highlight a helpful subtle distinc-
tion between a cartel comprised of all firms in 
an industry and a single-firm monopoly, which 
superficially may appear to be quite similar. 
While a monopoly is transparently a single seller 
with market power, a successful cartel is clandes-
tine, promoting the appearance of a competitive 
industry, thereby inducing suppliers or customers 
that deal with it to relax their guard and possibly 
dispense with strategies to diminish or combat 
the economic power of the invisible monopolist 
or monopsonist. Moreover, a clandestine cartel 
